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PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST PoLICY. Edited by Almarin Phillips. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965. Pp. ix, 454. $9.00. 
Has Congress established an antitrust policy for the United 
States? Have the so-called "antitrust 1aws"1 preserved and promoted 
competition? In the seventy-five years which have followed the 
adoption of the first federal statute purportedly directed at thwart-
ing restraints of trade and preventing monopoly, have the courts 
formulated a body of legal principles which clearly prescribe the 
business activities which the antitrust laws prohibit? Many students 
of antitrust law have taken the position that a negative answer 
must be given to these inquiries. They feel not only that the anti-
trust statutes have failed to promote a competitive business environ-
ment, 2 but also that the administrative agencies have not consist-
ently taken cognizance of the supposed objectives of these laws 
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1•7 
(1964); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1964); Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964); Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-136, 
21a (1964); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C, 
§§ 41-58 (1964). The prime objective of the Celler-Kefauver Act was to amend the 
Clayton Act so that the latter would prohibit certain business activities that pre-
viously did not fall within the condemnation of the act. For the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act and its objectives, 
see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). Although the act 
took the form of an amendment to the Clayton Act, it has been repeatedly referred 
to as the Celler-Kefauver Act rather than as a part of the Clayton Act, The same 
procedure is followed in the course of this review. 
2. For example, the purported objective of the Robinson-Patman amendment to 
the Clayton Act was to prohibit price discrimination which impaired competition. 
Whether the act was intended to foster competition or protect competitors is subject 
to debate. See generally BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATlllAN Acr (1964). 
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while discharging their duties with respect to overseeing various 
segments of the nation's economy.3 The upshot of this legal en-
vironment is that businessmen, even when aided by competent 
legal counsel, cannot accurately forecast whether a planned merger 
or other activity will later be declared violative of our antitrust 
laws.4 
Admittedly, benefits would inure to businessmen, as well as to 
other members of our society, if Congress and the courts clearly 
stated all the kinds of business activities that are prohibited by 
those acts of Congress collectively known as the antitrust Iaws.5 
However, the failure of the legislative and judicial branches of 
the federal government to announce succinctly the mandates of 
the law does not necessarily mean that they have been derelict in 
the performance of their duties. If each of these branches of the 
government directed its efforts toward tabulating once and for all 
a complete list of commercial activities which were to be treated 
as anathema to the economic well-being of the nation, would such 
an objective be attainable? In the milieu in which business must 
operate, such a goal seems unrealistic. Ours is a dynamic environ-
ment in which there is an ever-changing attitude toward the roles 
of government, business, and labor.6 Propriety does not have a fixed 
meaning; the consensus of one day may be the minority or discarded 
view of the next. Ideas as to what is good and what is bad appear, 
often fluctuate, and in time disappear. National goals are multiple 
rather than singular.7 In this setting, it is not surprising to find 
that our statutory scheme and judicial determinations in the field 
of antitrust are disjointed rather than symmetrical. Antitrust law 
in 1965 can be appropriately described as lacking consistency and 
being highly flexible, unsettled, and, to a degree, incomprehensible.8 
Perspectives on Antitrust Policy is a collection of seventeen 
essays. The essays, each of which constitutes a single chapter, were 
initially presented as lectures in a series of weekly seminars held 
at the School of Law of the University of Virginia during the spring 
3. For a compact consideration of the extent to which federal, state, and local gov-
ernment activities in practice thwart the operation of the antitrust laws, see MAssEL, 
COMPETlTION AND MONOPOLY 42·82 (1962). 
4. This problem is extensively probed in chapters 15 and 17 of Perspectives. 
5. A complete list of those business activities which are exempted by statute from 
the antitrust law appears in Perspectives at 301-11. 
6. The change in emphasis from equality of opportunity to economic security has 
had a significant impact on the nature of the effort exerted by the government in giv-
ing a sense of direction to the nation's economy. The appeal and decline of laissez-faire 
is clearly presented in FINE, l..AissEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELF.AllE STATE (1956). For 
a current study of the nation's economic structure, see GINZBERG, HIESTAND, & REUBENS, 
THE PLURALlSTIC ECONOMY (1965). 
7. See, e.g., Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, in GoALS FOR 
AMERICANS 1-31 (1960), in which fifteen distinct national goals are listed and analyzed. 
8. Most of the authors whose writings appear in Perspectives presumably would 
subscribe to this characterization. 
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semester of 1963. In a very short preface, the editor alludes to the 
diversity of approach, the dissimilarity of areas of expertise, and 
the differences of opinion of the contributors. He refers to the com-
plexities of the antitrust laws and the absence of precisely defined 
objectives. Mr. Phillips points out that the seventeen contributors 
are apprehensive that neither legislators nor judges seem to 
know exactly how best to shape the American economy so as to 
promote individual, business, and national economic health and 
growth. The editor views the themes which underly most of the 
essays as enigmatic. Most of the authors ponder the questions 
whether businessmen or the government should control the eco-
nomic development of the nation and whether our antitrust laws 
should seek to preserve competition or competitors. 
The general tone of Perspectives is one of dissatisfaction with 
the current state of the law. Most of the authors conclude that our 
legislators and judges have missed the mark. Similarly condemned 
are some of the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission° 
and the Federal Trade Commission,10 as well as such government 
activities as the ·purchasing of materials and equipment and the use 
of public funds to support research and development by private 
industry.11 Except for the chapter12 in which, contrary to the import 
of another chapter,13 the author writes in favor of continuing the 
scope of the present exemption of organized labor from the anti-
trust laws, accolades in support of our antitrust policies are almost 
entirely lacking. The bases of the discontent of these experts fall 
into several distinct categories. 
The Non-Economic Character of Our Antitrust Laws. Have the 
congressmen who have written in support of and voted for our anti-
trust laws been motivated by a desire to attain certain economic 
objectives, such as the efficient allocation of our nation's resources, 
or have they been driven by such non-economic concepts as demo-
cratic idealism or the desire to gain the approbation, and thereby 
_the votes, of their constituents? The goal of a country's economic 
structure, according to traditional economic thought, is to utilize 
the nation's human, natural, and capital resources most effectively 
and at the least possible cost. According to the advocates of laissez-
faire capitalism, this result can be brought about if the interaction 
of supply and d,emand is the exclusive determinant of the manner 
in which resources and capital are marshaled and used. Competition 
is the only regulator of this kind of economic environment. Price, 
assortment of products, and allocation of income and wealth are the 
9. Ch. 11. 
10. Ch. 1. 
11. Ch. 12. 
12. Ch. 16. 
13. Ch. 13. 
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result of the unrestricted interplay of each seller vying with every 
other seller and each buyer pursuing'his own self-interest by seek-
ing to obtain the most he can for what he offers in exchange. 
The.contributors to Perspectives assert that our antitrust legisla-
tion is not sufficiently directed at attaining the best kind of eco-
nomic environment for the nation.14 Instead, they insist, our laws 
over-emphasize that aspect of the American psyche which favors a 
society composed of many small businessmen rather than a small 
number of large business organizations. Attacking our antitrust 
laws on the ground that they fail to' deal with the problem which 
they are purportedly designed to resolve, these writers contend that 
in practice they often serve to deny the nation the economies of 
large-scale business operations. Further argument is made that the 
law in its present form serves to promote waste of the nation's re-
sources and capital equipment by shielding economically inefficient 
business enterprises from destruction; to the extent that the anti-
trust laws do not permit the untrammeled operation of those forces 
which bring success to those businesses which make the greatest 
contribution to the community and eliminate the least efficient 
businessmen, the American people have been denied the advantages 
inherent in an economy governed by unrestricted competition. 
Support for the position that our laws · are in many instances 
neither preserving nor promoting competition can be found in 
legislation and judicial decisions. Patently, the Miller-Tydings Act15 
and the McGuire Act,16 which exempt certain kinds of resale price 
maintenance arrangements from the antitrust laws, may actually 
stimulate anticompetitive behavior. Permitting manufacturers to 
set the price at which all retailers must market the manufacturer's 
merchandise protects an activity which is the antithesis of com-
petitive conduct. For example, in applying the Robinson-Patman 
Act the Supreme Court has held that a supplier violated the law by 
charging a retailer a lower price than that demanded of other re-
tailers in the same geographical area, even though the supplier was 
motivated to make such an arrangement in order to assist the in-
dividual retailer to meet the price being charged by retailers of a 
similar product.17 Indeed, the Court refused to ascribe any probative 
14. E.g., chs. 1 &: 2. 
15. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The Miller-Tydings Act 
is an amendment to the Sherman Act. 
16. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964). The McGuire Act ,is 
an amendment to the Federal Trade Com.mission Act. 
17. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). The anomalous situation which has 
xesulted under ,the Miller-Tydings Act and McGuire Act is illustrated by the xesult 
arrived at in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), where the Court indicated 
that a manufacturer's efforts to maintain the xesale price violated the Sherman Act if 
it failed to come within the exemption contained in the McGuire Act. 
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value whatever to that motivation.18 In arriving at its determination, 
the Court directed its attention to the impact of such a practice on 
the other retailers who sold the supplier's product rather than to the 
benefits which might inure to consumers by the reduction in price 
granted to meet competition. 
The foregoing is illustrative of one of the facets of antitrust pol-
icy which the essayists in Perspectives find objectionable. Such pre-
scribed norms are viewed as manifestations of an impulse to satisfy 
non-economic goals under the guise of preserving and promoting 
competition. According to these essayists, the neglect clearly to 
identify and distinguish economics from matters of a different na-
ture has resulted in the formulation of a body of legal rules which 
have hamstrung, rather than stimulated, our economy. 
Size and Power Rather Than Economic Impact as the Test of 
Illegality. The question is presented whether the size of a business 
organization, without regard to the characteristics of the particular 
segment of the economy in which it functions, is a proper standard 
to invoke in determining the illegality of certain kinds of action. 
The Sherman Act, on its face, condemns certain kinds of activities 
without any regard to whether the pattern of conduct in issue is in 
fact detrimental to competition.19 The Clayton Act declares that 
certain behavior is illegal if it tends to lessen competition substan-
tially or to create a monopoly.20 In Perspectives, it is argued that 
the current tendency of the courts to· apply these laws on a per se 
basis of unlawfulness, rather than on a. test of reasonableness under 
the circumstances, is injurious to American business as well as to 
competition.21 
18. The Court held that the good faith defense to price discrimination contained 
in § 2b of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which permits 
the lowering of prices to meet competition, was applicable only to horizontal and not 
to vertical competition., 
19. Section 1 of tlle act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or othenvise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.'' Section 2 pro• 
vides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor ••• .'' Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). 
20. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, prior to the Celler-Kefauver amendment, read 
in part as follows: "That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire • • • the 
whole or any part of the stock ••• of another corporation ••• where the effect of such 
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose 
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such 
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of 
commerce.'' Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). As amended, the section 
reads: "That no corporation ••• shall acquire •.• the whole or any part of the stock 
••• or any part of the assets of another corporation ••• where in any line of com• 
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly ••• .'' Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 
1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). 
21. See, e.g., ch. I. 
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Over the years the Supreme Court has vacillated between two 
approaches. At times the Court has employed a subjective frame of 
reference-is the action in question, in this industry, reasonable?22 
At other times, it has resorted to an objective test, asking whether 
a business which enjoys a given percentage of the market, or 
whether a certain kind of activity, in and of itself, is violative of the 
law.28 
The examination made in this book of business mergers raises 
the question of the propriety of applying antitrust concepts to ver-
tical and conglomerate combinations.24 One of the authors concedes 
that it may be consistent with sound eGonomic policy to prohibit 
certain horizontal mergers. He insists, however, that there is a very 
serious doubt as to whether a strong case can be made in economic 
terms to apply the mandates of the antitrust laws to vertical mergers 
and to conglomerate combinations.25 Why, then, have the courts ap-
plied antitrllst policies to vertical combinations and why liave some 
courts insisted that our antitrust laws should be applied to con-
glomerate combinations as well? It is suggested that the answer 
may be found for the most part in the fear which many Americans 
have of bigness, power, and the mere presence of power in the mar-
ket place. Inhibiting vertical and conglomerate mergers undoubt-
edly impedes the substitution of big business for small business. 
This result is consistent with the attitude that our national inter-
ests will best be served by the latter rather than the former type of 
business structure. 
The Sherman Act declares that a monopoly is illegal per se. Ex-
cept for those sectors of the economy where monopoly is protected 
by law, the bare possession of monopoly power is unlawful without 
regard to the manner in which it is used. One of the purported ob-
jectives of the Clayton Act is "to nip monopoly in the bud."26 In 
Perspectives this per se approach is depicted as unrealistic. The 
proposition that a monopolistic situation once established will re-
main unless abated by government action is rejected as fallacious. It 
is urged that, in our ever changing economic environment, monopo-
22. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Northern 
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See also United States v. First Nat'l 
Bank 8: Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1964). 
24. See chs. 2, 4, 8: 8. 
25. Ch. 8. For a discussion of the circumstances under which conglomerate mergers 
should be struck down under the Celler-Kefauver Act, see Turner, Conglomerate 
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAR.v. L. REv. 1313 (1965). Professor 
Turner is now the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice. 
26. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953). See also 
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 8: Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957). 
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lies will in time fade, their products replaced by the offerings of 
others in the market place. 21 
Of all of the attacks which the authors hurl at the current status 
of the antitrust laws, that condemning the current approach to 
monopoly seems to be the least tenable. It fails to take cognizance 
of the fact that monopolists do not simply stand by and permit 
others to invade their domain of dominance. While history is re-
plete with illustrations of monopolies being broken up, monopoly 
power being curbed, and potential monopolists being deterred by 
governmental action from expanding the realm of their omnipotence, 
one would indeed be hard pressed to find many instances where, 
absent such action, monopolists were overwhelmed by newcomers 
in the market place. Admittedly, changes in technology may have 
an adverse effect on an existing monopoly. However, mote often 
than not, the monopolist may be better equipped to utilize the 
fruits of change because of his position in the market place. The 
realities of life seem to strengthen, rather than erode, established 
monopolies. 
Exemptions From Antitrust Laws. Are certain actors in the mar-
ket place improperly exempted from the commands of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts? Is there something sacrosanct about labor, trans-
portation, insurance or those other participants in the market place 
which the law frees from the usual mandates of antitrust policy? 
Perspectives contains a cross-section of opinion in regard to this 
anomalistic feature of the law.28 The breadth of the immunity of 
labor from the Sherman and Clayton Acts is defended in one chap-
ter29 and 9bjected to in another.30 One author insists that section 14 
(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which permits states to enact so-called 
"right to work laws," should be retained; another argues for its re-
peal. A chapter devoted to the transportation industry concludes 
that the- regulators charged with overseeing this industry have be-
come to an extent the protectors, rather than the policemen, of 
those whom they are charged with policing.31 The author of this 
chapter of the book concludes that, because of administrative policies, 
the American people are being denied the benefits of competition 
in this sphere of the economy. As he views this sector, it is more 
protected than regulated. 
· The Torment of Uncertainty. Another one of the themes under-
lying this work is the lack of certainty in antitrust law. Both the re-
versal of previous positions, with the resulting inability of lawyers 
to predict with a reasonable quantum of confidence how a court 
27. Ch. 4. 
28. Ch. 12 deals exclusively with the question of exemptions, 
29, Ch. 16, 
30. Ch. 13. 
31. Ch. ll. 
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will rule in regard to a particular business procedure, and the drag 
on decision-making by businessmen caused by the lack of an ade-
quate basis upon which it can be determined whether a particular 
activity will later be declared unlawful are aspects of the current 
antitrust picture which are censured by several of the authors.32 
While there is merit in the criticism that these conditions are sym-
bolic of a basic defect in our antitrust laws, is there a remedy? The 
authors' proposals that greater attention be paid to the laissez-faire 
dogma, that government policies be more consistently applied, and 
that exemptions from antitrust laws, regardless of how well-in-
tended, be eliminated, fail to take into consideration the total en-
vironment in which American business must operate. Are the in-
consistency, the floundering, and the lack of clarity really avoidable? 
While certainty and precision would indeed be desirable, is it reason-
able to expect a simple, readily ascertainable, and settled set of norms 
in an area of human endeavor which itself is anything but static? 
As business objectives change, as new techniques appear and old 
ones vanish, as innovations give rise to formerly unforeseen·kinds of 
human activity, and as societal desiderata are modified, the law 
governing business arrangements must likewise change. It is this 
ability to change the commands of the law to meet the require-
ments generated by new events which has been commended as one 
of the strongest aspects of our legal system. Even a. cursory examina-
tion of the current contents of our criminal law or the law gov-
erning civil rights reveals that fundamental changes have been made 
in these areas within the past decade. The same can be said for 
other segments of the law. 
There is nothing unique about American business which will 
permit our antitrust laws to be reduced to an immutable set ·of 
standards. Ours is essentially an unstable economic environment, 
one which at times may even be described as volatile. In such an 
atmosphere it is constantly necessary to alter prescribed norms to 
meet the exigencies of change. Would the economy and the nation's 
businessmen have fared as well as they have if our antitrust poli-
cies had too little resiliency? Some of the essayists might be taken 
to task for their failure to applaud, however mildly, the overall 
willingness of the courts and Congress to change the law to meet. 
the needs of our society. 
Among the most notable features of Perspectives is its latitude. 
The material very beneficially forces the reader to think in terms 
of the total picture rather than individual aspects of a complex 
problem. It rejects a "cubbyhole" approach. Illustrative of the scope 
of the volume is the chapter entitled "The Influence of Interna-
32. Special consideration is given to this question in chapter 17, which is entitled 
The Impact of Antitrust Law on Corporate Management. 
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tional Factors," written by Kingman Brewster, Jr., in which the 
author compares the different standards of propriety enforced by 
the courts in regard to domestic and foreign commerce.88 With the 
increased significance of international trade in our economic life, 
this section of the book can prove especially helpful to those who 
have previously directed their attention exclusively to the domestic 
side of antitrust policies. 
A reader who is already familiar with antitrust law will find that 
this book will broaden his horizons. After completing his reading 
he will probably feel compelled to re-evaluate his prior personal ap-
praisal of current antitrust policies. Those who are specialists in one 
or tw-o spheres of antitrust law will find that they will return to their 
areas of concentration with new insights gained from having studied 
those chapters which delve into matters beyond their own immediate 
interest. For the neophyte, this volume can prove to be an especially 
helpful introduction to the field. The prime purpose of the authors 
is to shed light on fundamental concepts and dilemmas rather than 
to explore minutia, subtle niceties, and distinctions which more 
often than not serve to confuse, rather than edify, the newcomer. 
This volume, like others which undertake the study of a portion 
of the law in the throes of adapting to change, is somewhat dated. 
New material would have to be added to make this work entirely 
current. However, this factor does not detract from the exemplary 
manner in which this collection of essays deals with the problem of 
achieving the kind of economy to which our nation aspires. Those 
who have already read this book, as well as those who will do so in 
the future, would undoubtedly welcome to their library an ex-
panded and up-to-date edition of Perspectives, on the condition that 
it contain the same kind of breadth of treatment, depth of percep-
tion, and the touch of the polemic found in its predecessor. I for one 
would like to see how the same authors would treat the recent 
Supreme Court decisions relating to joint ventures,34 reciprocity,au 
and potential competition.86 It would indeed be pleasant to learn 
that in the immediate future the authors who contributed to Per-
spectives will undertake such a task. 
33. Ch. 14. 
Edwin W. Tucker, 
Assistant Professor of 
Business Law, 
The University of Connecticut 
34. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). 
35. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). 
36. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
